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Scholars suggest that public relations research is moving away 
from or beyond J. Grunig and L. Grunig's (e.g., 1992) well-known and 
much-discussed symmetrical model of public relations and toward 
cocreational models (Botan & Taylor, 2004). In particular, they 
suggest that dialogic theories, processes, and procedures best define 
the study and practice of public relations. One of the first to discuss 
dialogue, Pearson (1989b), argued that “the goal of public relations is 
to manage these communication systems such that they come as close 
as possible to the standards deduced from the idea of dialogue” (p. 
128). 
His untimely death kept him from further pursuing his standards 
of dialogue, but his writings make the worth of the pursuit clear: 
The important question becomes, not what action or policy is 
more right than another (a question that is usually posed as a 
monologue), but what kind of communication system maximizes 
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the chances competing interests can discover some shared 
ground and be transformed or transcended.   
                                                       (Pearson, 1989a,p. 206) 
The idea of maximizing participation of all competing voices runs 
parallel to Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action and the 
resulting discourse ethics as has been mentioned by communication 
scholars, including Pearson (1989b) (see also, Kent & Taylor, 1998; 
Leeper, 1996; Meisenbach, 2006). Continuing interest in Habermas's 
theories can assist scholars in the pursuit of dialogic standards. In that 
tradition, we seek to develop Habermas's (1990, 1993) concept and 
procedure of discourse ethics as one such standard for dialogic public 
relations. 
Leeper (1996) and Meisenbach (2006) offered entry points into 
the dialogic potential of public relations by employing Habermas's 
discourse ethics. Despite these and other theoretical discussions (e.g., 
Kent & Taylor, 2002), actual examples of dialogic public relations are 
very difficult to find. The question remains then, what obstacles 
prevent organizations from enacting a truly dialogic model of public 
relations and further what might that model look like? 
We begin by discussing recent public relations research on the 
developing dialogic roles of publics and review relevant concepts of 
Habermas's communicative action and discourse ethics. We then 
consider these issues and methods in relation to a recent corporate 
controversy between the Walt Disney Company and the shareholder-
focused revolt known as the Save Disney campaign. We apply 
Habermas's (1990,1993, see also Leeper, 1996; Meisenbach, 2006) 
concept and procedure of discourse ethics as a standard for dialogic 
public relations, using it to analyze the successes and failures of the 
rhetorical moves made by both the Walt Disney Company and Save 
Disney campaign from 2002 to 2005. This case provides an 
opportunity to identify obstacles, opportunities, and strategies for 
enacting discourse ethics within dialogic public relations practice. 
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Publics and Dialogue 
Public relations scholars are reconceptualizing publics with 
increasing frequency. First, there are the progressively more blurred 
lines between individual and organizational rhetors (Cheney & 
McMillan, 1990; Crable, 1990). In addition, Botan and Taylor (2004) 
pointed out that early public relations scholarship took a functional 
approach to publics, viewing them as a means for achieving an 
organization’s goals. However, they noted a turn in the research 
toward a cocreational perspective of organization–public relations (e. 
g., Leitch & Neilson, 2001). Publics in this sense are not passive 
recipients of public relations strategies, but are active and engaged “as 
producers and reproducers of the community of discourse”            
(Chay-Nemeth, 2001, p. 2). 
Vasquez and Taylor (2001) provided additional direction for how 
scholars might begin to advance the ways in which publics are 
addressed. Publics should be framed as rhetorical communities. This 
perspective brings a communicative framework to the forefront, 
viewing “a public as a rhetorical community that emerges over time 
through communication interactions such that a group consciousness 
is developed around an issue or a concern” (Vasquez & Taylor, 2001, 
p. 147; see also Springston & Keyton, 2001). The public envisioned 
here also parallels what Botan and Taylor (2004) referred to as a 
cocreational public that is actively involved in a meaning-making 
process. It suggests a form of public relations that embraces the 
presence of rhetoric in organization-public relations (R. L. Heath, 
2001). 
The challenge is to view publics and organizations in a dialogic 
perspective both theoretically and practically (Botan, 1997; R. L. 
Heath, 2001). Because of difficulty of the difficulty of operationalizing 
dialogue, most research fails to incorporate a sense of the back and 
forth between organizations and publics. Many public relations studies 
focus on how the organization defends itself against challenges with 
very little consideration of the rhetorical positions of publics, except as 
obstacles that must be overcome (e.g., L. Grunig, 1992). On the other 
side is activist research, which has focused primarily on the rhetoric of 
the non-organizational challengers (e.g., Reber & Berger, 2005). 
Scholars are still looking for integrated considerations of the rhetoric of 
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both sides, and how that can or fails to engage in dialogic 
consideration of the contested issues (Edwards, 2006). Perhaps, the 
best example of this kind of work is found in Brimeyer, Eaker, and 
Clair's (2004) study of the agitation and control typologies present in a 
labor union and employing company's rhetoric during a crisis. 
However, they focused on classifying the strategies of each party 
rather than on defining the connections between them or the 
procedure through which they sought to persuade each other. So while 
public relations scholars recognize the need for a dialogic perspective 
(R. L. Heath, 2001; Pearson, 1989a, 1989b), most research in the 
area has failed to examine what this dialogue might look like in 
practice. We turn to discourse ethics as a way of seeing and 
understanding public relations dialogue in action. 
Communicative Action and Dialogue 
Habermas's promotion of communicative action as a process in 
which all stakeholders have access to public deliberation resonates 
with calls for dialogic public communication. Because of the complexity 
and value of Habermas's work for pursuing and understanding 
dialogue in public relations, we first provide an introduction to his 
communicative action and then explore how communicative action 
provides for his theory of discourse ethics. 
Habermas's (1984, 1987) theory of communicative action 
focuses on how people act within the lifeworld, which is the context 
and background of meaning that humans inherit through culture and 
which defines how they see the world. The lifeworld comprises three 
rationalization structures: personality, culture, and society. Each 
rationality represents a divergent way of seeing and making sense of 
the lifeworld, and Habermas argued that all three structures of 
rationality should be maintained and balanced in modern society. 
Personal rationality addresses internal concerns, how we talk to 
ourselves. Cultural rationality focuses on social concerns that are 
publicly considered, while societal rationality circumvents discussion 
and is driven by forces of power and profit. 
Habermas's discussion of societal and cultural rationalities leads 
to his discourse ethics. Stemming from modern society's increasing 
bureaucratization, societal rationality's forces of power and profit 
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problematically dominate or colonize the lifeworld. Whereas cultural 
rationality entails open discussion and debate about claims, societal or 
system rationality does not involve this type of discussion; it sidesteps 
discussion. Often today's corporations employ a form of societal 
rationality and bypass public deliberation of issues and decisions that 
publics believe they should be involved in discussing. That is, publics 
often call for the type of debate entailed in communicative action while 
corporations ignore this call (see Deetz, 1992). 
In contrast to the corporate tendency toward societal rationality, 
Habermas focused on and promoted cultural rationality developed 
through communicative action. Habermas (1984) defined 
communicative action as “the type of interaction in which all 
participants harmonize their individual plans of action with one another 
and thus pursue their illocutionary aims without reservation” (p. 294). 
Furthermore, communicative action is based on the debate of 
criticizable validity claims. 
The bases of validity claims include: the truth, normative 
rightness, and sincerity of the claim being made (Habermas, 1984). In 
communicative action the publics must be able to take a stance of yes 
or no in relation to these claims and judge to what extent they see the 
speaker's statement as true, right, and sincere. First, claims are 
judged by whether they are true or untrue, that is, a speaker asserts 
and a listener may challenge whether a statement is true. In addition 
to the truth or falsity of statements, validity of claims is also judged by 
rightness. In other words, by saying some statement p, the speaker 
asserts that “It is right that p” (1987). Finally, the validity of claims is 
judged by the standard of sincerity. These claims to sincerity address 
“the truthfulness that the speaker claims for expression of a subjective 
experience to which he has privileged access” (1984, p. 309). Judging 
this claim requires knowledge of the speaker's intention (J. Heath, 
2001), which participants judge by available contextual information. 
Habermas (1990) argued that all three validity claims are 
present in every utterance. Every time a speaker makes an utterance 
within the framework of cultural rationality, she wants the audience to 
accept the truth, rightness, and sincerity of her statement. As 
Meisenbach (2006) noted: 
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The appealing suggestion of the copresence of the validity 
claims is that the truth or falsity of a statement does not stand 
separate from its rightness and sincerity. If I say, “I give money 
to the United Way,” I am arguing (cognitively) that it is true 
that I donate money to the United Way. On a moral level, I am 
also claiming that donating to the United Way is right or just in 
this situation and that it is ethical for me to present such an 
argument. Finally, I am claiming on the aesthetic level to be 
truthful or sincere (rather than sarcastic or contradictory to my 
other statements and actions) in my utterance. All three claims 
are present in my utterance, ready to be defended. (p.42) 
Thus, truth, rightness, and sincerity of utterances remain 
necessarily connected and ideally are considered together. When 
placed in the context of public relations, if they discuss their claims at 
all, corporations often limit themselves to focusing on the truth or 
falsity of their claims, while overlooking discussion of whether the 
utterance promotes something good or is sincerely offered. It is 
worthy of mention that consideration of the truth and rightness validity 
claims is very similar to how the issues management literature (e.g., 
R. L. Heath, 1997) considers gaps in organization-public perceptions of 
questions of fact and value relating to issues. In addition, the third 
validity claim, sincerity, can be linked to discussions of the 
management of credibility or ethos. Habermas argues that these three 
points of contest are simultaneously part of decisions about whether to 
accept the policy suggested by an utterance. 
While believing that this debate of validity claims occurs via 
communicative action, Habermas argued that one of the primary 
reasons that communicative action is disrupted is the colonization of 
the lifeworld. This colonization occurs when the non-discursive steering 
mechanisms of profit and power the cultural rationality value spheres, 
corrupting and halting the process of communicative action. This 
stance is distinct from R. L. Heath’s (2001) suggestion that a process 
of statement and counterstatement will continue after the introduction 
of a profit motive. Habermas suggests that the introduction of a 
societal rationality statement into public discourse is colonizing 
because it short-circuits the debate of validity claims, leading to 
automatic support for whatever action enhances efficiency and profit. 
Societal rationality stops the conversation. For example, in the 
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colonized lifeworld, if someone offers free computers for every student 
at a university, the university would automatically accept the gift 
because doing so fits the profit steering mechanism. The lack of 
discussion means that questions about whether students need the 
same computers, what impact the computers will have on education, 
or how the university might become obligated to the donor will not be 
considered; communicative action is bypassed. 
For Habermas, the goal is not to eliminate societal rationality. 
Rather, a balance between cultural and societal rationality is needed. 
Within today's modern corporations, tendencies toward societal 
rationality are strong. In particular, public relations practice, which 
seems geared toward the promotion of cultural rationality, mutual 
understanding, and agreement, is often stymied by the profit and 
power motives of today's corporate culture.1 However, in an age of 
increasingly stronger calls for corporate social responsibility, 
organizations should attend to their roles as a part of both the societal 
(i.e., profit making centers) and the cultural (i.e., socially responsible 
entities) spheres. 
Habermas's discourse ethics can be seen as an attempt to keep 
societal rationality and its nondiscursive steering mechanisms of power 
and money in check. This perspective can guide organizations toward 
dialogic public relations and help scholars and practitioners understand 
how publics react to the actions and statements of organizations. 
Discourse Ethics 
Habermas’s (1990, 1993, 1996) discourse ethics outlines a 
procedure for moral deliberation based on his Principle of 
Universalization (Principle U), which states that all affected by an 
utterance can accept those consequences. Leeper (1996) pursued 
discourse ethics as an alternative to the relativism of the situational 
perspective in public relations. He discussed how Habermas's 
conceptualization of the ideal speech situation and validity claims could 
be used to generate codes of ethics for public relations practitioners. 
He concluded that Habermas’s work could be used to both evaluate 
and guide public relations practices. However, while providing an 
excellent background on the antecedents to discourse ethics, Leeper's 
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work did not fully address the procedural implications of Habermas’s 
development of Principle U. 
Meisenbach (2006) explicated the implications of discourse 
ethics for scholars by breaking down Principle U into five practical 
steps: 
1. identify an utterance for deliberation, 
2. identify all stakeholders who would be affected by the 
implementation of this utterance, 
3. articulate the utterance to all identified as affected, 
4. discursively debate among affected parties the consequences 
and value of the utterance, and 
5. form judgment of the validity and acceptability of the 
proposed utterance. 
These steps are presented as the procedure for enacting Habermas's 
discourse ethics and thus as a framework for assessing the rhetorical 
moves of organizations and publics. 
Through this discourse ethics procedure, various norms and 
individual ethical standards are established, challenged, and altered. 
The universal aspect of Principle U in fact suggests that this procedure 
occurs universally and naturally, regardless of culture or willingness of 
individual participants. As such it means that even when a particular 
organization resists the procedure or skips steps in it, that as long as 
societal rationality has not completely eliminated cultural rationality 
then Principle U is salient. If concerns of corporate responsibility and 
accountability to shareholders belong to the realm of cultural 
rationality, this means that even when organizations choose to ignore 
these steps they remain relevant terms of debate. 
Meisenbach (2006) used this procedure as an analytical 
framework for understanding and assessing public resistance to the 
American Red Cross's (ARC) establishment and use of the Liberty Fund 
after the terrorist attacks in 2001. She found that while the ARC had 
violated (skipped some of) the steps inherent in Principle U, publics 
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still followed the procedure and criticized the ARC's private decision 
about handling the funds. This example focused on the relevance of 
the principle to the rhetoric of a non-profit organization. Because of its 
universality, discourse ethics has much explanatory and analytical 
potential for those interested in understanding and assessing relations 
among publics and all kinds of organizations. To demonstrate and 
expand this potential, we examine how the policies and practices of 
the Walt Disney Company (WDC) were challenged first by internal 
board members and then by an ad hoc activist organization known as 
Save Disney. Specifically, we analyze the relevant and accessible 
rhetoric from these parties from 2002 to 2005 seeking their enactment 
and/or denial of a discourse ethics procedure. 
The Bid to Save Disney: The Case of the Save 
Disney Campaign 
Many people have long been fascinated by the operations and 
seeming magic that is the Walt Disney Company (WDC) empire. The 
company and its trademark characters are known worldwide. WDC is 
the second largest media and entertainment company in the world: Its 
enterprises include its theme parks, movie and television studios, and 
consumer products (Hoover’s, 2007). In 2006, the company had over 
130,000 employees, nearly one million shareholders, and revenues in 
excess of $34 billion (Hoover’s, 2007; Walt Disney Company, 2006a, 
2006b). The “magic” that; surrounds the company’s history and 
current operations explains why this organization garners worldwide 
interest. 
Many have tried to capture the lore of Disney through narratives 
of the company’s history and biographies about its leaders. Beyond 
telling the story of Disney, business, sociology, media, and 
organizational communication scholars have long been interested in 
Walt Disney (the founder) and the WDC. Much of the scholarly work 
analyzes the content of the movies and characters produced by the 
company (e.g. Hoerrner, 1996; Lacroix, 2004). Other work addresses 
the mythology of the company and juxtaposes the constructed story of 
Walt Disney and the magical company that he created with the 
“reality” of the man and the company’s existence (Boje, 1995; Wasko, 
2001). These investigations address what Disney means in society. 
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Disney’s magical culture is a large part of the success of the 
larger organization. However, efforts to create and preserve magic are 
juxtaposed with the practices needed to maintain profitability. Smith 
and Eisenberg (1987) analyzed the specific communicative practices 
and metaphors tied to the company’s culture as they addressed how 
WDC management and employees created and negotiated a conflict 
during the 1980s at the southern California theme park, Disneyland. 
The authors highlighted the degree to which management’s focus on 
the need to cut corners conflicted with employee desires to retain the 
family focus of the company. Specifically the connotations of the family 
metaphor in the WDC culture (primarily articulated by employees) 
conflicted with the profit and efficiency focused needs associated with 
the drama metaphor (primarily used by management). The authors did 
not focus on the ways in which this conflict exemplifies the tension 
that Habermas highlighted between the system and the other spheres 
of the lifeworld. However, such a parallel exists and could be explored 
further. 
Disney’s challenge of maintaining a balance between societal 
and cultural rationality is highlighted in the shareholder-driven revolt 
known as the Save Disney campaign. While this particular campaign 
and the events surrounding it brought these issues to light, the culture 
of the WDC had already created the conditions for these problems. In 
what follows, we outline the communicative stance adopted by the 
company leading up to the campaign and analyze the particular 
rhetorical strategies employed by the WDC and the managers of the 
Save Disney campaign. In so doing, we seek to identity both moments 
in which the principle of discourse ethics was employed and those in 
which opportunities for engaging in dialogue were missed. 
Analyzing the WDC/Save Disney Dialogue 
In this analysis we focus on how the rhetoric of the WDC and 
Save Disney campaign seeks, denies, and contributes to dialogue, 
specifically comparing it to a discourse ethics procedure. We begin 
with the WDC culture and rhetoric just prior to the formation of the 
Save Disney campaign, focusing on how it relates to dialogue and 
discourse ethics. 
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Disney’s Corporate Culture of (Non) Dialogue 
To understand the goals and strategies of the Save Disney 
campaign, it is helpful to first understand the communicative culture at 
the WDC. The board of directors at the WDC had a history of limiting 
open discussion of company practices long before Save Disney began 
(see Smith & Eisenberg, 1987). The analysis that follows suggests that 
similar issues affected the board of directors of the WDC in the 1990s 
and beyond. 
In the 1990s, two WDC board members, Roy Disney, Walt 
Disney’s nephew, and Stanley Gold, Roy’s lawyer and friend, began to 
challenge the decision-making processes of the board and particularly 
the leadership of Michael Eisner, WDC CEO and chair of the board. 
According to Stewart (2005), for several years Roy and Gold felt that 
their verbally expressed concerns had been ignored. Both men had 
spoken directly to Eisner about their concerns and tried unsuccessfully 
to remind him of a promise he had allegedly made in the 1980s that 
he would step down if the two men ever questioned that he was still 
right for the job. In 2002, Gold began sending letters to the board 
members expressing the same concerns. 
In August 2002, Gold wrote a letter to fellow board member Ray 
Watson who had been quoted in a news article suggesting that the 
whole board supported Eisner. Gold, who recently had been harshly 
reprimanded by Eisner for allegedly talking to the media himself (an 
accusation Gold vehemently denied), wrote: 
We, the Directors, are guilty of not discussing the real issues 
affecting the company. We have not fully and critically 
addressed the failed plans of our executives or the broken 
promises that management has made to the Board and the 
shareholders... We are too polite, too concerned with hurting 
each other's feelings, when our real job is (a) to protect the 
shareholders and (b) to coalesce around a management team 
and a plan that we believe will get us out of our current malaise. 
                                            (quoted in Stewart, 2005, p. 404) 
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Gold was arguing that the board was guilty of squashing dissent and 
ignoring problems. 
Board members and investors began challenging Gold over 
allegations that he had been taking his grievances to the press, that is, 
to those outside of the WDC board of directors. The day after Gold 
spoke with a New York Times reporter (after gaining Eisner’s 
permission to do so) influential investor Sid Bass wrote a letter Gold 
and copied it to all of the board members: 
every board member has a fiduciary duty not to make 
statements to investors, investment bankers, and the press 
which will damage the company...I am not addressing the 
merits of either side of a debate, but how a debate is properly 
waged...you must play by the rules or step down. 
                               (as cited in Stewart, 2005, pp. 406-407) 
Bass’s words make clear that the norms inside WDC promoted a 
very narrow definition of acceptable debate, much less dialogue. The 
assumption was that the only appropriate place for debating the 
management of the Company was the boardroom. Bass's letter also 
suggested that board members are not supposed to share any 
negative information, even with the shareholders. In a response to 
Bass, Gold argued: “The problem at the Walt Disney Company is not 
Stanley Gold, it is not leaks (real or imagined) or unprofessional 
conduct, but instead it is poor performance, lack of credibility and 
accountability and poor capital allocation” (p. 408). This statement 
sums up the arguments and utterances that Gold and Roy had been 
trying to present to the board and became the cornerstone of the Save 
Disney campaign that was to come. 
Amidst this contentious communicative environment, a 
September 2002 board meeting loomed. Gold continued to try to 
generate support for his stance. Gold’s arguments centered on his 
contention that the CEO was not providing even the board with all of 
the financial information it needed to make responsible decisions in the 
interest of shareholders. So at the September board meeting, Gold 
formally presented his case. However, there was no discussion 
afterward, and his subsequent request to call for a vote on whether to 
hire outside consultants to better assess the situation was resisted and 
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tabled. At the same meeting, Eisner presented his own action plan and 
urged a unanimous vote of support for the plan to show board unity to 
the outside world. Roy refused and that vote was also tabled to avoid 
formalizing the board’s split to outsiders. The “decisions” to avoid 
making decisions appeared to be a norm and established a culture that 
clearly violated the discourse ethics procedure. In a letter of April 3, 
2003 to director George Mitchell (copied to all directors) Gold 
challenged this procedural issue, saying: “I fear that our inability to 
discuss difficult problems and make hard decisions is an abdication of 
our fiduciary duty” (as cited in Stewart, 2005, p. 431). But such 
statements made little difference. 
The issue came to a head in November 2003, when a board 
member met with Roy to tell him that the board members had decided 
that he would not be renominated to the board. In response, Roy 
resigned from the board and his position in animation. Gold resigned 
soon afterward and his resignation letter, posted on the original 
December 2003 Save Disney website, noted that the decision to 
remove Roy from the board was “yet another attempt by this board to 
squelch dissent by hiding behind the veil of ‘good governance.’ What a 
curious result.” He also questioned the recent WDC policy “barring 
board members from communicating with shareholders and the media” 
and suggested that by acting “independently” perhaps “I can have 
greater success in shaping the policies, practices and operations of 
[WDC] than I had as a member of the board.” Eisner reportedly did 
not consider Roy and Gold to be a great threat; however, history 
proved him wrong because these events led to Roy and Gold launching 
the ad hoc organization and Internet-based activist campaign known 
as Save Disney. 
The Save Disney campaign is interesting not only for its 
magnitude and unique approach, but in this context it marks a turning 
point in how WDC issues are discussed. Of interest here is a turn from 
practices that clearly violated discourse ethics procedures by 
preventing open debate to interaction that allowed space for the 
rhetorical arguments of multiple stakeholders. It is this turn that is the 
focus of the rest of this analysis. 
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Save Disney’s Contribution to Dialogue 
While the Save Disney campaign used multiple tools, including 
an email list-serv and in-person visits to proxy services, the focal point 
of the campaign was a website launched in December 2003. The 
original website was very simple, with a one-paragraph introduction 
and links to Roy’s and Gold’s resignation letters along with a thank you 
message/explanation from Roy to all Disney cast members.2 A 
disclaimer at the bottom of the page noted: “This website has been 
established to provide a forum for discussing, analyzing and critiquing 
the performance, direction, and management of The Walt Disney 
Company.” In contrast to the culture of the board, which served to 
stifle discussion and debate, Roy and Gold were creating a forum 
through which they could share and debate existing WDC 
communication as well as their own communication that had been 
silenced by the Disney board. Thus, Roy and Gold reasserted the need 
for the WDC to engage in dialogue. 
In early January 2004, Roy and Gold introduced a more 
sophisticated website. There, they laid out the primary goal of the 
campaign. This stated goal represents the central utterance and first 
step in the discourse ethics procedure that we focus on for the 
remainder of this analysis (see Table 13.1). In a letter on January 27, 
2004, they urged shareholders to vote “NO on the reelection of 
Michael Eisner, George Mitchell, Judith Estrin, and John Bryson as 
directors,” because “they symbolize, respectively, the poor 
management, poor governance, poor compensation practices, and lack 
of board independence that are impeding the development of long-
term shareholder value at The Walt Disney Company.” This was the 
same goal Roy and Gold worked to achieve from within the board. 
The launch of the Save Disney campaign represented a new 
opportunity to move through a discourse ethics procedure. Beginning 
with the selection of the utterance, instead of suggesting an external 
review of the board’s processes, the Save Disney campaign argued for 
the removal of the individuals who seemed most closely linked to the 
lack of debate occurring on the board, that is, to the shutting down of 
a discourse ethics procedure. They then considered all who were being 
and would be affected by the implementation of this utterance and 
came up with a broad set of stakeholders. In stark contrast to the 
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narrowly defined appropriate public as determined by the WDC board, 
on December 10, 2003, a posting on the site explained that the 
SaveDisney.com website was “devoted to those concerned about the 
welfare of The Walt Disney Company and its future direction.” Next we 
turn to how the primary claim was publicly debated. 
The Save Disney website actively invited public discussion and 
participation. It provided colorful graphics, streaming audio and video, 
extensive links to stories on the company, interactive poll questions, 
an invitation for any site visitor to join the SaveDisney.com mailing 
list, personal and frequently updated statements from Roy, and 
postings of news and commentaries relating to the company from 
around the world. There were also distinct sections for different 
categories of stakeholders including: families, consumers, and 
employees. As such, the website invited participation by company 
shareholders, but also a wide range of external stakeholder groups. 
Comments and stories from visitors to the site frequently became 
highlighted contributions to the website and campaign. 
While a wide variety of Disney stakeholders were publicly 
participating in discussions about the contested practices of the WCD 
and its leadership via the SaveDisney.com website and its list-serv, 
finding relevant public discussion and responses from the WDC board 
and/or Eisner is more challenging. In December 2003, a brief WDC 
press release announcing new board members was the only official 
statement that even implied Roy's and Gold's departures. Much more 
visible were Roy’s and Gold’s in-person and video-conference 
presentations of their positions and reasoning to proxy advisory 
services in early 2004. On February 2nd, they made a particularly 
important presentation to Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). 
Shortly after the presentation, ISS issued a public report questioning 
WDC’s strength and the blending of management and board positions. 
ISS recommended that shareholders vote “withhold” on Eisner, and 
that they should wait and see what changes that vote generated in the 
company before voting no on other board members (Stewart, 2005). 
Such moves may have finally prodded the WDC board into 
entering public discussion of the contested issues. On February 6, 
2004, the board of directors issued a statement to shareholders 
acknowledging and refuting the challenges being generated through 
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the Save Disney campaign. In addition to highlighting current Disney 
successes, several lines were devoted to rebutting Save Disney 
arguments about the poor governance and lack of board 
independence. However, the overall message of the statement was 
that Roy and Gold were wrong to be challenging the company: “You 
may have heard recently about the attack being waged by two former 
directors against the chief executive officer and certain members of 
the Board of Directors of your company. You should be disturbed by 
this attack” (Walt Disney Company, February 6,2004). The letter went 
on to characterize Roy’s and Gold’s actions as “trying to distract the 
Board and management.” These statements from the WDC board 
highlight the degree to which the board was still operating under the 
assumptions that dissent was unhelpful and that non-board members 
had no business trying to engage in debate about company policies. 
Also, while a response to the Save Disney campaign, these comments 
do not directly respond to the content of Roy’s and Gold’s claims. 
Rather, in their statement, board members were challenging Roy’s and 
Gold’s right to make such claims. Couched in the scheme of 
communicative action, the board was challenging the rightness and 
sincerity of the Save Disney claims, while leaving alone the issue of 
the truth of the campaign’s statements. 
In an open letter to shareholders posted on the SaveDisney.com 
website on February 12, 2004, Roy and Gold responded to the 
accusations of being an inappropriate distraction: 
We disagree with the Board’s attitude that this is not the time 
for dissent. In our view, open discussion is essential to good 
corporate governance and the creation of shareholder value, 
regardless of whether the stock price is up or down. We made 
every effort as Board members to engage the Board in a 
constructive dialogue regarding the crucial issues facing Disney 
in the past few years, when Disney’s stock price traded in the 
teens. Our efforts were deprecated and rebuffed. If it was not 
the time to challenge management then, and it is not the time 
to challenge management now, when is the time? 
They then restated their position on the WDC: “We believe Disney 
needs a Board and senior management who will approach difficult 
issues head-on, after giving careful consideration to disparate points of 
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view.” In contrast with the statements offered by the WDC board, 
these comments speak directly to the truth, rightness, and sincerity of 
the board’s claim. Roy and Gold addressed the argument that they are 
not sincere or the appropriate people to address these issues. In part 
they respond by making an implicit call for a discourse ethics 
procedure, approaching issues, hearing various stakeholders, and 
facing them head on. They concluded by saying: “We believe that 
Disney’s current senior management seeks to avoid this type of 
dialogue and our Board experience has confirmed that the Board is 
unwilling to pursue this type of exchange.” The focus of the Save 
Disney campaign was the failure of the current leadership; however, in 
advancing this argument, the campaign managers also asserted the 
need for dialogue. 
The WDC board responded to the Save Disney campaign’s 
efforts with its own letter, on February 17th. The directors argued that 
the company was on strong financial ground, but did not address any 
of the challenges about a lack of dialogue on the board. Instead, most 
of the letter again tried to undermine the credibility of Gold and Roy: 
“In the face of this significant recovery, it is unfortunate that Stanley 
Gold and his client Roy Disney persist in waging their distractive 
propaganda campaign against The Walt Disney Company and its Board 
of Directors.” Under a subheading of “The bottomline for Disney 
shareholders” the directors declared, “You have every right to be 
concerned that [Roy and Gold] are putting their own interests ahead of 
yours.” However, nowhere did the board state what Roy’s and Gold’s 
interests were or how they might differ from the reader’s own 
interests. 
The day before the shareholder meeting on March 2nd, board 
member Mitchell argued in the Wall Street Journal that “The changes 
we have made have resulted, from our listening. We listened to the 
concerns that have been expressed about the company and about all 
of corporate America” (Mitchell, 2004). However, the concerns the 
board “heard” were about boards that are too large, and lacking 
independence, diversity, and expertise, and not about the actual 
leadership of the company. By this time, the Save Disney list serv had 
approximately 35,000 registered members who received regular email 
updates from Roy and the campaign (Magill, 2004), but Mitchell did 
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not directly address the campaign and its claims about WDC 
leadership. 
At the official shareholder meeting, Gold and Roy spoke to 3000 
shareholders (Orwall, Steinberg, & Lublin, 2004). Roy reasoned: “We 
need to install a new management team, one that understands and 
believes in the enormously valuable legacy that’s been entrusted to 
us.” As usual, Gold’s rhetoric was harsher: “Let me be clear. No half 
measures, no excuses, no amount of spinning will be tolerated. 
Michael Eisner must leave now” (as cited in Stewart, 2005, p. 509). 
At the end of the meeting, the initial voting tallies were 
announced. Whether accidental or not, Stewart (2005) reported that 
Eisner attempted to adjourn the meeting without announcing any 
voting results. When attendees chanted “vote, vote,” Eisner said, “I 
almost got away with that, didn't I?” (Ahrens, 2004). While only the 
initial raw numbers were read at the meeting, according to final official 
numbers released in April 2004, Michael Eisner had received a no 
confidence vote from 45.37% of shareholders, and board member 
George Mitchell received a 25.69% no confidence vote (“Walt Disney 
Co.,” 2004). On the surface, the vote demonstrated a near split. But in 
the context of the typical full support recorded in shareholder board 
elections, and the realization that the 45% withhold vote represented 
the largest withhold vote ever received by a CEO, the will of the 
oppositional voice was clear. 
Later that evening, the WDC issued a press release announcing 
the decision to separate the positions of CEO and chairman of the 
company, creating a new position of Chairman of the Board, to which 
George Mitchell was appointed (Walt Disney Company, March 3, 
2004). This move did not end the disagreements among the company 
stakeholders, but it was a catalyst for significant changes in WDC 
governance over the ensuing five years. Six months later, Eisner 
announced he would resign as CEO of the WDC effective September 
2006. The Save Disney campaign praised the decision, but argued that 
the change was not occurring soon enough, and continued to call for 
Eisner’s immediate resignation. At this point, yet another utterance 
went through the discourse ethics procedure. 
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Eventually, Eisner agreed to step down in September 2005, and 
to not seek reelection for his board position in 2006 (Marr, 
Mangalindan, & Lublin, 2005). Eisner’s own choice for his successor, 
Bob Iger, was appointed as CEO of WDC. After several meetings with 
Iger in July 2005, the WDC, Roy, and Gold issued a joint statement 
that they had come to a resolution and the Save Disney campaign 
would come to an end (Orwall, 2005). Time will tell how much this 
incident will influence public relations practice at the WDC. 
Discourse Ethics Procedure and the Save Disney 
Campaign 
The events and discourse surrounding the Save Disney 
campaign are intriguing in their own right as a historic and successful 
challenge to corporate management practice. Beyond this, these 
events provide a compelling example for considering opportunities and 
challenges for dialogue between corporations and their stakeholders. 
This outcome warrants our offering of several generalizations that help 
define dialogic public relations. 
In considering the “Vote No” utterance in the context of the 
second step (identifying who would be affected by the implementation 
of this utterance), we have established how the WDC board generated 
a very narrow assessment of the relevant stakeholders (the board 
members) and allowed Roy’s and Gold’s arguments to be shared only 
with this select group. The board then refused to engage in discussion 
and debate about the consequences of the utterance even among its 
members and avoided making a judgment about the utterance, thus 
straying from the discourse ethics procedure. 
The launch of the Save Disney campaign represented an 
attempt to expand the debate to a wider audience of stakeholders, and 
consequently, restart the discourse ethics procedure. In stark contrast 
to the narrowly defined appropriate publics as determined by the WDC 
board, the Save Disney website was “devoted to those concerned 
about the welfare of The Walt Disney Company and its future 
direction” (December 10, 2003 website). The website included 
comments directed at WDC board members, employees, shareholders, 
and consumers. The creation of the Save Disney campaign and 
website allowed Roy and Gold to enact step three (articulating the 
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utterance to everyone they had identified as potentially affected by it). 
While the prevailing communication culture of the board was one that 
stifled debate, the tactics of the Save Disney campaign forced the 
WDC board members to participate in step three (albeit in limited 
terms). 
The fourth step of the discourse ethics procedure entails debate 
among the parties about the consequences and value of the utterance. 
Shareholder concerns were articulated and discussion was allowed. 
During this fourth step of debate, the conditions of communicative 
action become most relevant. Communicative action prescribes specific 
criteria for debate among stakeholders. The statements offered by the 
campaign and the resulting responses from the WDC represent the 
bulk of the discussion and debate in this campaign. A focus on the 
various bases of validity that communicative action entails helps to 
explain in part the way in which this debate played out. Rather than 
addressing the truth (factual validity) of the Save Disney claims, the 
WDC board members focused on the rightness and sincerity of these 
claims. In contrast, the Save Disney campaign focused on the factual 
truth of the WDC statements and emphasized the degree to which the 
board was not being sincere in its communication. The end result is 
that the two parties were not engaged in productive debate or 
dialogue. 
While the focus here has been on the debate between the Save 
Disney campaign managers and the WDC board, other stakeholders 
did participate in this debate. The investor proxy services participated 
through public statements supporting the Save Disney campaign’s 
advocacy for withholding support for Eisner. Employees, shareholders, 
and consumers voiced their support for the arguments made by Roy 
and Gold. However, only direct WDC shareholders could participate in 
the formal vote about the utterance under consideration. 
Finally, the fifth step, forming judgment on the validity and 
acceptability of the norm, was enacted through the vote at the annual 
shareholder meeting. The results sent a clear message that many 
stakeholders believed that Eisner and his fellow board members should 
be removed, thus supporting the initial claims made by Roy and Gold. 
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In the end, the arguments of the Save Disney campaign 
prevailed, but not without a long and difficult fight. The success of the 
Save Disney campaign can be attributed in part to the degree to which 
its actions embraced the discourse ethics procedure. While its 
participation in discussions with the WDC did not always directly 
address the claims made by the company, it did remain true to the 
ideal of involving a broad range of stakeholders and allowing for open 
exchange. This is perhaps the greatest failure and missed opportunity 
of the WDC. Eisner and the board clearly overlooked the potential 
impact of such a public dialogue, and as such, participated in the 
dialogue in a limited sense. It is unclear if outcomes would have been 
different had the WDC fully participated in the discussion. However, 
this stands as a missed opportunity for the company. What remains to 
be seen is if the corporate governance at WDC will now follow a 
deliberation procedure with its publics that is more in line with 
discourse ethics. 
Discussion 
Corporations today are more likely to acknowledge their 
accountability to their shareholders and the board members who 
represent them, particularly given the recent corporate scandals. 
However, the case covered here occurred after the Enron, WorldCom, 
and Tyco scandals and yet the WDC’s CEO, Eisner, appeared to forget 
that he needed to engage in dialogue even with the company’s board 
members. The blurred lines between internal and external publics also 
became clear in this case as rhetorical discussions that were originally 
limited to a very internal locus, eventually became front page news 
across the country, playing out for both internal and external publics. 
What is also significant to note about the events leading up to 
the campaign is the degree to which the board action parallels 
Habermas's description of the colonization of the lifeworld and failure 
to create conditions of communicative action. Board members such as 
Roy and Gold found that even in their privileged internal company 
position, when they had an utterance to share, they did not get to 
decide who the stakeholders in that utterance were (step two), had to 
seek Eisner’s permission before they could share the utterance with 
most stakeholders (step three), debate of the utterance was often 
squelched (step four), and judgments of many utterances were not 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Rhetorical and critical approaches to public relations, Vol. II, (2009): pg. 253-271. Permalink. This article is © Taylor & 
Francis (Routledge) and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & 
Francis (Routledge) does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
22 
 
 
allowed (step five). According to such accounts, Eisner and the board 
had created a communicative culture that cut off dialogue. In contrast, 
Pearson (1989b) argued that "dialogue is a precondition for any 
legitimate corporate conduct that affects a public of that organization" 
(p.128). 
This case serves as a cautionary tale to managements that 
might still be inclined not to pursue or even to stop dialogic relations 
with their publics. Habermas’s discourse ethics suggests that even 
when someone or something attempts to circumvent the procedure, 
the principle of universalization is just that, universal. The principle 
and its procedure will be pursued by interlocutors. Just as board 
members, victims’ families, donors, and elected officials found a path 
to enact a discourse ethics procedure in the Liberty Fund case, so did 
stakeholders of the Disney company. Once it became clear that 
presentations of positions and arguments that ran counter to Eisner’s 
would not be entertained or heard, that is, that a process even 
remotely resembling a procedure of discourse ethics was not in place 
on the board, Roy and Gold left the boardroom and found an 
alternative path for enacting a discourse ethics procedure. Thus, the 
current chapter demonstrates how Principle U plays out in public 
relations. These days, corporations are increasingly aware of their 
accountability to a wide range of publics, and further research can 
explore how a discourse ethics procedure plays out among a wider 
range of organizational stakeholders. This procedure offers a useful 
plan for organization–public communication as well as a scholarly tool 
for assessing such relationships. 
It should also be noted that the recent development and impact 
of the Internet played a significant role in facilitating the discourse 
ethics procedure in this case, but had both strengths and weaknesses. 
On the positive side, it clearly allowed Roy and Gold to interact with a 
wide range of stakeholders. Anyone who could access the Internet and 
felt a linkage to the WDC, could become a member of the campaign 
and participate in discussions through the site. However, the Save 
Disney web team carefully controlled the website and our analysis of 
the extensive website found only one letter posted from an employee 
that was mildly critical of the Save Disney stance. It is unclear if voices 
of opposition to the campaign were censored from or simply were not 
submitted to the website. 
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This uncertainty reminds us that while the Save Disney 
campaign might have been clamoring for more dialogic public relations 
between the WDC and its publics, the campaign website itself was not 
a fully dialogic site. It offered a voice for a stance that was not being 
allowed within the WDC, but didn’t provide much divergence on its 
own pages. While the campaign encouraged debate, only one choice: 
was advocated on the website. Thus, it took the input from the WDC, 
the Save Disney campaign, other websites, the formal press, and 
untold others to generate a truly dialogic space. 
This finding points to a final contribution of this case study, 
which is to highlight the degree to which dialogue exists in a much 
broader space than previously imagined. Dialogue does not simply 
entail exchanges between two parties in a single interaction. Rather, it 
seems in today's ever-changing communication climate that dialogue 
entails participation from multiple parties, in a variety of forums. 
Further rhetorically based research could focus on websites that claim 
to be (and may be) a forum for all sides of an issue. Studies and 
examples like these can further enhance our understanding, pursuit, 
and analysis of dialogic public relations. 
Notes 
1. While some scholars suggest that agreement is the ideal goal of 
public relations, we suggest that even when agreement is not 
possible, understanding of divergent positions can still be 
beneficial for organization–public relations. 
2. All Disney employees are known as cast members. 
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Appendix  
Table 13.1 Steps of Discourse Ethics for the Save Disney Campaign 
 
 
 
